Please Join the AOM 2025 Presenter Symposium: Frontier Strategy Research on Competition and Regulation in Platform Markets
Time:
1:45PM - 3:15PM, Tuesday, July 29th
Location:
Auditorium 11 – Bella Center
Organizers:
Aldona Kapacinskaite – INSEAD
Yongzhi Wang – The Ohio State University
Ahmadreza Mostajabi – Singapore Management University
Discussants:
Tobias Kretschmer – Imperial College London
Yue Maggie Zhou – University of Michigan
Participants:
Annamaria Conti – IE University
Juan Santalo – IE Business School
Madhulika Kaul – City University of London
Joost Rietveld – University College London
Hyuck David Chung – University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Cameron Miller – Syracuse University
Elena Plaksenkova – The Ohio State University
Shiva Agarwal – University of Texas at Austin
Presentations:
1. The Hidden Costs of Fairness in Platform Markets: The Dynamics of Lowering Developer Royalty Rates
2. Who gets to play? Effects of regulation-induced platform governance change on complementors
3. Post-mates No More? Complementor Engagement Following Platform Acquisition
4. How Does Ecosystem Technological Structure Shape Complementor's Strategy
Symposium Overview:
Market power in platform markets has attracted significant regulatory and scholarly attention. Within a platform market, complementor firms themselves are heterogenous in terms of market power that they can accrue. For instance, through acquisitions, complementor firms can develop economies of scale and scope on both the technology- and user- sides such that future entrants are deterred (Wang, Yue, Rajagopalan, & Wu, 2024). Complementors that have developed stronger network effects (Eisenmann, 2007; Rochet & Tirole, 2003) are also in a more powerful position when it comes to negotiating with the platform owner (e.g., Epic Games vs. Apple and Google). However, because platform markets, such as Apple's App Store and Alphabet's (Google's) Play Store, are relatively closed economies where complementors are typically smaller firms compared to the platform owner, within-platform competitive dynamics and the loci of power have attracted less regulatory attention.
Additionally, previous research suggests that platform owners shape competitive dynamics through strategic actions such as merging with other platforms (e.g., Farronato, Fong, & Fradkin, 2023), entering into complementors' markets (e.g., Kapacinskaite & Mostajabi, 2024; Khan, 2017; Wen & Zhu, 2019; Zhu & Liu, 2018), altering platform governance (e.g., Chung, Zhou, & Choi, 2024; Rietveld & Schilling, 2021), or enveloping related markets (e.g., Eisenmann, Parker, & Van Alstyne, 2011; Gawer & Henderson, 2007). Yet, given the limited research on competition and regulation in platform markets in strategic management, further research is encouraged to directly address this important topic.
In this symposium, we assemble a set of recent strategic management research tackling this cutting-edge issue-that is, competition and regulation in platform markets. We focus on two major themes when putting together this symposium: first, competitive dynamics among complementors within a platform market that are likely to attract regulatory attention; and second, platform owners' actions that are likely to attract antitrust scrutiny.
Sincerely,
Yongzhi (Alex) Wang
Assistant Professor
The Ohio State University, Fisher College of Business
OSU Webpage: https://fisher.osu.edu/people/wang.2877
Google Scholar: https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=lgdz7eYAAAAJ&hl=en
Email: wang.2877@osu.edu